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Caucasian Powder Keg: Ramil Safarov’s 
Transfer and its Effect on Armenian-
Azerbaijani Relations 
 
DANIEL ROSSI 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the centuries, the Caucasus region in the near east has 
hardly been a peaceful corner of the world. Situated on the divide 
between Europe and Asia,1 its position at the crossroads of western and 
eastern civilization combined with the fact that the region contains over 
fifty different ethnic groups2 means that the area has seen its fair share 
of turmoil. 
The 20th century was no different for the Caucasus. Towards the 
end of the Cold War and immediately before the fall of the Soviet 
Union, friction again started to appear in the south Caucasus between 
the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples.3 Ethnic tension had arisen 
between both countries as well as within each country; Armenia had a 
sizeable population of Azerbaijanis and Azerbaijan had a large 
population of Armenians.4 The main source of the conflict between the 
two peoples was centered on a disputed territory called Nagorno-
Karabakh.5 An ancient area traditionally associated with Armenians and 
 
 1. Caucasus, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (May 2006), 
http://www.loc.gov/today/placesinthenews/archive/2006arch/20060503_caucasus.html. 
 2. Caucasian Peoples, BRITANNICA ACADEMIC EDITION, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/100262/Caucasian-peoples (last visited Jan. 5, 
2015). 
 3. Bill Frelick, Faultlines of Nationality Conflict: Refugees and Displaced Persons from 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, 6 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 581, 589-90 (1994). 
 4. See id. at 589.  
 5. See id. 
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Armenian culture since the Middle Ages,6 Nagorno-Karabakh is 
formally within the borders of Azerbaijan.7  
Tension from various pogroms8 in Azerbaijan along with the 
mutually aggressive behavior between the two sides led to in-fighting 
between Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian and Azerbaijani populations.9 
After each country gained its independence as a result of the Soviet 
Union’s fall, the ethnic tension turned into a brutal and destructive six-
year conflict between Azerbaijan and an ethnically Armenian-led 
Nagorno-Karabakh independence army,10 which Armenia heavily 
supported.11  
Tensions continued to run high after the war.12 In recent years, 
some progress was made as both sides came to the table to talk about 
the future of the conflict;13 progress soon came to a halt in 2012, when 
Azerbaijan had pardoned one of its military officers, Ramil Safarov, 
after he was convicted of having murdered Armenian military officer 
Gurgen Margaryan in Hungary in 2006.14 In September of 2012, 
Hungary transferred Safarov to Azerbaijan under the articles of the 
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons in order to serve out 
the remainder of his life sentence in his home country.15 Instead of 
enforcing the sentence, however, Azerbaijan welcomed Safarov as a 
hero,16 a brave soldier who had gotten revenge on the enemy by killing 
 
 6. Michael Ajemian, Territorial Stalemate: Independence of Nagorno-Karabakh Following 
the Dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Its Lingering Effects Decades Later, 34 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 375, 386 (2011). 
 7. Phil Gamaghelyan, Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Identity, Politics, 
Scholarship, 15 INT’L NEGOTIATION 33, 35 (2010). 
 8. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines a pogrom as “the organized killing of many 
helpless people usually because of their race or religion.” Pogrom, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pogrom?show=0&t=1411929931 (last visited Sept. 
25, 2014).  
 9. Arzu Turgut, Who Benefits from Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict?, 4 USAK Y.B. INT’L 
POL. & L. 341, 341 (2011). 
 10. Frelick, supra note 3, at 581-83. 
 11. Gamaghelyan, supra note 7, at 36. 
 12. See Tabib Huseynov, Mountainous Karabakh, Paradigms for Peace and Development in 
the 21st Century, 15 INT’L. NEGOTIATION 7, 7-8 (2010). 
 13. Id. at 14-16.  
 14. EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA (2012) 0356 [hereinafter Texts Adopted]; see also Sarah 
Kendzior, The Axe Murderer Who Became a Facebook Hero, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201293953565974.html. 
 15. Texts Adopted, supra note 14. 
 16. See id.; Hungary Red-Faced after Azerbaijan Frees Murderer, BUDAPEST TIMES (Sept. 
4, 2012), http://www.budapesttimes.hu/2012/09/04/hungary-red-faced-after-azerbaijan-frees-
murderer. 
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on his own terms,17 and subsequently pardoned and promoted him.18 As 
might be expected, the reaction from Armenia was one of outrage, and 
the fallout from the whole situation has led to a collapse in diplomatic 
relations between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Hungary.19 
This note will argue that while Hungary’s transfer of Safarov was 
legitimate, Azerbaijan’s pardon of Safarov was contrary to international 
law and will further erode the relationship between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan by raising the possibility of war and by reinforcing negative 
ethnic views between the two peoples. Firstly, the note will explore the 
history of ethnic violence and tension between Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis, explain the circumstances of Safarov’s murder of 
Margaryan, Safarov’s trial and conviction in Hungarian court, and his 
transfer and pardon by the Azerbaijan government. Secondly, the note 
will explain the purpose and text of the Convention on the Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons (hereinafter “the Convention”), the treaty that 
permitted Hungary to transfer Safarov to Azerbaijan. Thirdly, the note 
will analyze the legality of Safarov’s transfer and pardon, arguing that 
while Hungary’s transfer of Safarov was legitimate, Azerbaijan’s 
pardoning of his crime violated Articles II, X, and XII of the 
Convention, in violation of international law. Finally, the note will 
explore the negotiation process that has existed between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan since the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, and explain that 
Azerbaijan’s pardon of Safarov will do nothing but destroy the 
likelihood of conflict resolution, raising tensions between the two 
nations. 
II. THE VIOLENT HISTORY BETWEEN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN AND 
SAFAROV’S CRIME AND TRANSFER 
This section will begin by providing the historical context of 
Safarov’s motivation to kill Margaryan by exploring the violent history 
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, the Nagorno-Karabakh War, and 
how the war impacted the peoples of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh. The discussion will then move to the circumstances 
surrounding Safarov’s murder of Margaryan, his trial in Hungarian 
court, and his transfer to and pardon by Azerbaijan. 
 
 
 17. Kendzior, supra note 14. 
 18. Texts Adopted, supra note 14. 
 19. Armenia Breaks Ties with Hungary over Clemency for Murder, RT (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://rt.com/news/armenia-azerbaijan-hungary-murder-087/. 
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A. Tensions Created in Conflict: Ethnic Violence and the Nagorno-
Karabakh War 
To put the current situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan into 
context, one must understand the impact that ethnic violence, as well as 
the Nagorno-Karabakh War, has had on the two countries. Armenians, a 
Christian people, and Azerbaijanis, a Turkic Muslim people,20 have an 
ongoing history of conflict with one another dating back to the end of 
World War I.21 After the fall of the Tsarist Russian Empire, both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan briefly became independent Republics,22 with 
conflict soon erupting between the two nations and peoples.23 Before the 
end of World War I, Armenians living within the Ottoman Empire were 
victims of the Armenian Genocide, in which the Ottomans killed up to 
1.5 million Armenians.24 This event “created a deep and lasting scar” 
and is a memory that “continues today to influence Armenia’s actions 
and attitudes towards its neighbors.”25 With the genocide still “fresh in 
the minds” of Armenians living within the new republic, and afraid that 
the advancing Ottoman army would subject them to the same fate, 
Armenians started to attack the local Turkic Azerbaijani population 
within Armenia.26 Both of the new republics also laid claim to Nagorno-
Karabakh as well as the territories of Nakhichevan and Zangezur, 
fighting “over the fate of the three territories.”27  
In 1921, both countries came under the rule of the Soviet Union.28 
The Soviet Union proclaimed to respect the cultural rights of minorities 
within the Union, and created the Armenian and Azerbaijani Soviet 
Socialist Republics.29 Creating each republic along “nationality lines” 
helped with the development of a national consciousness and cultural 
identity in Armenia and Azerbaijan.30 This put minority groups in each 
country, however, at a disadvantage; both the Armenians in Azerbaijan 
 
 20. Ajemian, supra note 6, at 385. 
 21. Huseynov, supra note 12, at 12. 
 22. Ajemian, supra note 6, at 387. 
 23. Id. 
 24. VAHAKN M. DADRIAN, THE HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: ETHNIC CONFLICT 
FROM THE BALKANS TO ANATOLIA TO THE CAUCASUS 372 (Berghahn Books, reprinted 
paperback ed. 2004). 
 25. Frelick, supra note 3, at 584. 
 26. Id. at 584-85. 
 27. Nadia Milanova, The Territory-Identity Nexus in the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: 
Implications for OSCE Peace Efforts, 2 J. ETHNOPOLITICS AND MINORITY ISSUES IN EUROPE 3 
(2003); Ajemian, supra note 6, at 387. 
 28. Ajemian, supra note 6, at 387.  
 29. Frelick, supra note 3, at 586. 
 30. Id. at 587. 
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and the Azerbaijanis in Armenia were not free to develop or express 
their respective cultures.31  
In addition, the “nationality lines” that the Soviets drew were not 
completely accurate.32 Josef Stalin, at the time Lenin’s Commissioner of 
Nationalities,33 retained the borders in such a way that Nagorno-
Karabakh, which at the time was ninety-four percent Armenian,34 
remained a part of Soviet Azerbaijan. In addition, heavily Azerbaijani 
Zangezur remained a part of Armenia, while heavily Armenian 
Nakhichevan remained a part of Azerbaijan.35 Stalin did this as part of a 
“divide-and-rule policy,”36 which created “interdependent republics that 
would feel bound to remain in the [Soviet] union,” thus suppressing 
nationalist activity.37 
Despite the issues of minority repression and inaccurate national 
borders, the Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh lived in 
relative peace throughout the Soviet period.38 This peace lasted until 
1988, when Nagorno-Karabakh petitioned Azerbaijan to be annexed to 
Armenia.39 Armenians saw the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Armenia as important to the rebuilding of a dispersed Armenian 
nation.40 In response to the petition, “ethnic Azerbaijani delegates in 
Nagorno-Karabakh boycotted the vote.”41 Immediately afterwards, two 
Azerbaijanis were killed and many were injured in Stepanakert, the 
capital of Nagorno-Karabakh; the official cause of the casualties 
remains in dispute.42 
Once word of the dead Azerbaijanis spread toward the Azerbaijani 
city of Sumgait, a violent pogrom began against Armenians, which 
resulted in the deaths of thirty-one people.43 Similar acts started 
occurring throughout Azerbaijan during 1988, with increasing numbers 
of Armenian residents coming under more danger.44 From 1989 until the 
fall of the Soviet Union, strife between the two ethnic groups persisted; 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. at 587-88. 
 33. Id. at 587. 
 34. Ajemian, supra note 6, at 387. 
 35. Id.; Huseynov, supra note 12, at 12. 
 36. Huseynov, supra note 12, at 12.  
 37. Frelick, supra note 3, at 587-88. 
 38. Huseynov, supra note 12, at 13. 
 39. Frelick, supra note 3, at 589-90. 
 40. Id. at 589. 
 41. Id. at 590. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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an economic war between the two countries developed, spontaneous 
acts of violence against Armenians continued, and thousands of 
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh were deported from their homes.45 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh no longer seeked 
unification with Armenia and subsequently declared its independence 
from Azerbaijan in 1992.46 No state, including Armenia, recognized the 
legitimacy of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence; Armenia did, 
however, continue to lend support to Nagorno-Karabakh and remained 
involved in its politics.47  
Soon after Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh War officially started, with Azerbaijan launching 
military operations against Stepanakert.48 At the beginning of 1992, the 
ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh had a number of military 
successes and also captured several Azerbaijani villages.49  
Since then, the war became a more general war for territory as 
opposed to one involving acts of ethnic violence.50 “Due to tactical 
failures,” the Azerbaijanis began losing territory,51 including Shusha, the 
center of Azerbaijani life in Nagorno-Karabakh, where thousands of 
Azerbaijanis became displaced as a result.52 Azerbaijan then responded 
by pushing into Nagorno-Karabakh and displacing thousands of 
Armenians; some of the displaced Armenians have since returned.53 
During a major political crisis in Azerbaijan in 1993, Armenian forces 
were able to take advantage of the political chaos and launch an 
offensive.54 As a result, Armenian forces were able to capture many 
towns outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, one of which included Safarov’s 
hometown, Jabrail.55  
After this string of Armenian victories, in 1994, “representatives of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh signed a Russian-
brokered ceasefire,”56 “cementing” the gains the Armenian military had 
 
 45. See id. at 591-93.  
 46. Id. at 593.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Ajemian, supra note 6, at 388. 
 49. Frelick, supra note 3, at 594. 
 50. Id. at 595. 
 51. Ajemian, supra note 6, at 388. 
 52. Frelick, supra note 3, at 595-96. 
 53. Id. at 596. 
 54. Id. at 596-98. 
 55. Id.; Marina Grigorian, Murder Case Judgment Reverberates Around Caucasus, 
INSTITUTE FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Apr. 6, 2006), http://iwpr.net/report-news/murder-
case-judgement-reverberates-around-caucasus. 
 56. Ajemian, supra note 6, at 389. 
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made.57 As a result of the war, approximately 30,000 people died and 
50,000 people were wounded.58 Furthermore, approximately 300,000 
Armenians fled from Azerbaijan and 185,000 Azerbaijanis fled from 
Armenia; two-thirds of the original population of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
both Armenians and Azerbaijanis, are no longer there.59 Although 
“reconciliation [typically] follows conflict resolution,”60 this is not the 
case for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. This situation 
“remains the longest running and most intractable conflict in the 
region;”61 furthermore, its protracted negotiation process has given the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the status of a “frozen conflict.”62 
B. Ramil Safarov’s Murder of Gurgen Margaryan in Hungary and his 
Subsequent Trial 
In January of 2004, Azerbaijani military officer Ramil Safarov and 
Armenian lieutenant Gurgen Margaryan, both twenty-six years old at 
the time,63 traveled to Budapest to participate in a three-month English 
language course as a part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.64 
Military officers of various nationalities, including Serbs, Uzbeks, 
Azerbaijanis, and Armenians attended the program,65 and despite the 
mix of backgrounds, the subject of international conflict between the 
attendants’ respective countries was never an issue outside of initial 
conversations.66 Balazs Kuti, Margaryan’s Hungarian roommate, said 
that Margaryan rarely talked about Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.67 In 
addition, Hayk Makuchyan, the other Armenian attending the program, 
stated that neither he nor Margaryan had any interactions with Safarov 
or the other Azerbaijani officer during the program; they would instead 
go straight to their rooms after class.68 During his first interrogation, 
 
 57. Huseynov, supra note 12, at 13. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 13-14. 
 60. Aytan Gahramanova, Paradigms of Political Mythologies and Perspectives of 
Reconciliation in the Case of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, 15 INT’L. NEGOTIATION 133, 133 
(2010). 
 61. Huseynov, supra note 12, at 14. 
 62. See Gahramanova, supra note 60, at 149. 
 63. Grigorian, supra note 55. 
 64. Biography of Gurgen Margaryan, BUDAPEST CASE, 
http://budapest.sumgait.info/margaryan-bio.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 65. Kuti Balazs, an eye-witness, BUDAPEST CASE, http://budapest.sumgait.info/kuti-balazs-
account.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 66. Murder of Lt. Gurgen Margaryan, BUDAPEST CASE, 
http://budapest.sumgait.info/murder.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 67. Kuti Balazs, an eye-witness, supra note 65. 
 68. Murder of Lt. Gurgen Margaryan, supra note 66. 
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Safarov declared that he decided to kill Margaryan and Makuchyan after 
Safarov heard them mutter something in Armenian before smiling at 
him.69 
On the night of February 18, Safarov left the premises where he 
and the other participants of the program were staying and bought an 
axe.70 Approximately five o’clock in the morning, Safarov entered the 
unlocked room of Margaryan and Kuti and swung the axe multiple 
times at Margaryan’s neck and face.71 A post-mortem report revealed 
that Safarov delivered a total of sixteen blows to Margaryan’s body.72 
After Kuti woke up from the commotion to see his roommate being 
murdered, he yelled at Safarov to stop what he was doing; Safarov told 
him not to worry because he had no troubles with him.73 Kuti ran out of 
the room to wake up the other students for help.74  
After murdering Margaryan, Safarov walked down the corridor 
looking to murder Hayk Makuchyan next.75 Along the way, Safarov 
admitted to asking one of the Uzbek participants if he wanted to join in 
the killing of Makuchyan.76 After failing to break down Makuchyan’s 
locked door with the axe, many of the other students surrounded 
Safarov to calm him down until Budapest police arrived and 
apprehended him.77 After the arrest, Budapest Police Major Valter Fulop 
commented to reporters that the murder was committed with “unusual 
cruelty” due to the murder’s extremely violent nature.78 A political 
motive was among the possibilities as to why Safarov committed the 
crime.79 
At trial two years later in 2006, Safarov confessed to the murder of 
Margaryan and was given a life sentence in prison and a minimum of 30 
years before any parole hearings could take place.80 Safarov presented 
 
 69. Vladimir Polupanov, Об убийцах с топором и национальных героях [About the Axe 
Murderer, and National Heroes], АРГУМЕНТЫ И ФАКТЫ (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://www.aif.ru/society/article/54923. 
 70. Ramil Safarov’s First Interrogation, BUDAPEST CASE, 
http://budapest.sumgait.info/safarov-interrogation.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Grigorian, supra note 55. 
 73. Kuti Balazs, an eye-witness, supra note 65. 
 74. Ramil Safarov’s First Interrogation, supra note 70. 
 75. Grigorian, supra note 55. 
 76. Ramil Safarov’s First Interrogation, supra note 70. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Armenian Officer Murdered By Azeri Colleague in Hungary, ASBAREZ (Feb. 19, 2004), 
http://asbarez.com/49541/armenian-officer-axe-murdered-by-azeri-colleague-in-hungary. 
 79. Murder of Lt. Gurgen Margaryan, supra note 66. 
 80. Hungary Jails Azerbaijani Killer, BBC (Apr. 13, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4907552.stm. 
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many defenses to the court in order to somewhat justify his behavior. 
First, Safarov claimed his behavior was partly the result of post-
traumatic stress stemming from his childhood in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
which included Armenians taking his hometown of Jabrail during the 
Nagorno-Karabakh War.81 Safarov’s father reported that during the 
Armenian taking of Jabrail, two cousins of Safarov lost their lives at the 
hands of the Armenian army.82  
Safarov then shifted the focus towards the alleged actions of 
Margaryan that supposedly pushed him to murder. Safarov first claimed 
that Margaryan insulted the Azerbaijani flag by wiping his boots with 
it,83 saying that the red on the flag represented the Azerbaijani blood that 
Armenians spilled during the war.84 Safarov also claimed that 
Margaryan played an audio recording of young Azerbaijani girls 
suffering during the Nagorno-Karabakh War.85 Witnesses, however, 
have not confirmed any of these two allegations by Safarov.86 Before 
the court gave its sentence, Safarov asked the court to take into 
consideration his mental state but refused to apologize for what he had 
done.87 The judge rejected this request, saying that the murder was pre-
meditated and “carried out with extreme cruelty;”88 it was also 
“emphasized that the murder of a sleeping man in peace time is always 
a crime and cannot be an act of heroism.”89 Safarov appealed his 
sentence but the Hungarian appellate court upheld the trial court’s life 
sentence, noting that Safarov had killed Margaryan because he was 
Armenian.90  
C. Safarov’s Transfer to Azerbaijan and the International Reaction to 
His Pardon 
In the summer of 2012, Armenian newspapers started reporting 
about the possible transfer of Safarov back to Azerbaijan, which took 
 
 81. Grigorian, supra note 55. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Katy Pearce, Deep Dive: Filling in the Gaps – Reading The Ramil Safarov Case In 
Azerbaijan, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Sept. 10, 2012), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/filling-in-the-gaps-azerbaijani-media-construction-of-narrative-over-
ramil-safarov-case-armenia/24703619.html. 
 84. Grigorian, supra note 55. 
 85. Pearce, supra note 83. 
 86. Grigorian, supra note 55. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Hungary Jails Azerbaijani Killer, supra note 80. 
 89. Grigorian, supra note 55. 
 90. Azeri Jailed for Life in Hungary for Killing Armenian, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2007), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/22/idUSL22518458. 
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many Hungarians by surprise.91 After much lobbying from Azerbaijan92 
in addition to the constant pressure Azerbaijan gave Hungary since 
Safarov’s conviction,93 Hungary agreed to transfer Safarov according to 
the Convention.94 Despite pressure from Armenia to not comply with 
Azerbaijan’s request, Hungary emphasized the legality of its decision to 
transfer Safarov under the Convention.95 To reinforce its position, 
Hungary claimed that Azerbaijan had sent assurances that Safarov 
would serve the twenty-five years that remained on his sentence.96 
Hungary transferred Safarov back to Azerbaijan on August 31, 2012;97 
Armenia officially cut diplomatic ties with Hungary later that evening.98 
Serving the remaining twenty-five years from his sentence was the 
last thing that Safarov would do. Immediately upon returning to 
Azerbaijan, the president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, pardoned 
Safarov and claimed that he was well within his power to pardon 
Safarov based on the Azerbaijani Constitution as well as article XII of 
the Convention.99 Safarov was not only pardoned, but treated as a 
national hero. The government promoted him to the rank of major,100 
gave him an apartment in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku, and 
retroactively paid him to compensate for all of the time he spent 
incarcerated in Hungarian prison.101  
On September 2, 2012, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(hereinafter “the Ministry”) denied that Hungary had known that 
 
 91. András Rácz, ‘The Shadow of an Axe’: Exploring the Hungary-Azerbaijan-Armenia 
Diplomatic Tensions, E-INT’L RELATIONS (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/30/the-
shadow-of-an-axe-the-background-of-the-hungary-azerbaijan-armenia-diplomatic-
tensions/#_ftn9. 
 92. Ellen Barry, A Hero’s Welcome for Convicted Killer Reignites Tensions, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/world/europe/pardon-reignites-azerbaijan-
armenia-tensions.html. 
 93. A.L.B., Hungary, Armenia and the Axe-Murderer Blunder in Budapest, ECONOMIST 
(Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/09/hungary-armenia-
and-axe-murderer. 
 94. Közlemény Ramil Sahib Safarov Azerbajdzsán részére történt átadásáról  [Ramil 
Safarov Azerbaijan Sahib happened to notice for the transfer of] (Sept. 1, 2012), available at 
kormany.hu/hu/…/kozlemeny-ramil-sahib-safarov-azerbajdzsan-reszere-tortent-atadasarol. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Thomas de Waal, Viewpoint: Setback for Peace in the Caucasus, BBC (Sept. 4, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19477043. 
 97. Texts Adopted, supra note 14. 
 98. Armenia Cuts Ties with Hungary over Azerbaijan Killer Pardon, BBC (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19440661. 
 99. Texts Adopted, supra note 14. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Barry, supra note 92; Hungary Red-Faced after Azerbaijan Frees Murderer, supra 
note 16. 
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Azerbaijan would pardon and reward Safarov upon his return, citing a 
letter dated to August 15, 2012 from Azerbaijan that it would continue 
to enforce the sentence for at least twenty-five more years.102 The 
Ministry further condemned these actions by Azerbaijan.103 The 
Hungarian people followed suit by protesting against the decision, 
demanding an explanation from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor 
Orban.104 On September 3, 2012, however, Orban was seemingly 
unapologetic about the whole affair, stating that this was an issue 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan that Hungary should not be involved 
in and that Hungary had done nothing wrong.105 
The international community responded in outrage to Safarov’s 
transfer and pardon. In Armenia, protestors pelted the Hungarian 
consulate with tomatoes and burned the Hungarian flag.106 Other 
examples of condemnation were shown outside of Armenia and 
Hungary as well. Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha of Russia said 
the pardon was a violation of international law;107 the U.S. Department 
of State, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Minister of 
Cyprus, and the European Parliament all expressed concerns over 
Azerbaijan’s actions and their effect on regional tensions between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan.108 In addition, further protests by Armenians 
outside of Armenia, such as those in Rostov-on-Don in Russia, took 
place at other Hungarian missions.109 
 
 102. Press Release, EMBASSY OF HUNGARY IN OSLO, NORWAY (Sept. 2, 2012), 
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kulkepviselet/NO/en/en_Hirek/20120903Pressrelease.htm.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Marton Dunai, Hungarians Protest Against Release of Azeri Officer, REUTERS (Sept. 4, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/04/us-hungary-azerbaijan-protest-
idUSBRE8830ZR20120904. 
 105. Rácz, supra note 91. 
 106. Armenia Breaks Ties with Hungary over Clemency for Murder, supra note 19. 
 107. Комментарий Генерального секретаря Организации Договора о коллективной 
безопасности Н.Бордюжи о ситуации вокруг решения властей Азербайджана помиловать 
убийцу армянского офицера [Comment from the Secretary General of the Collective Security 
Treaty Bordyuzha about the situation surrounding the decision of the Azerbaijani authorities to 
pardon the murderer of Armenian officer], available at http://www.odkb-
csto.org/news/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=1101. 
 108. Press Statement, U.S. Dept. of State, Pardon of Azerbaijani Soldier (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/197250.htm; France Diplomatie, Azerbaijan – Pardon 
granted to M.Safarov – Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman (Sept. 3, 2012), 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/azerbaijan/france-and-azerbaijan/political-
relations-6890/article/azerbaijan-pardon-granted-to-m; Texts Adopted, supra note 14.  
 109. Армяне Ростова-на-Дону провели акцию у представительства Венгрии 
[Armenians in Rostov-on-Don Held a Rally at the Mission of Hungary], БЛОКНОТ (Sept. 3, 
2012), http://www.bloknot-
rostov.ru/news/more/armyanerostovanadonuproveliakcijuupredstavitelstvavengrii.html. 
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III. BACKGROUND AND APPLICABLE ARTICLES OF THE STRASBOURG 
CONVENTION ON THE TRANSFER OF SENTENCED PERSONS 
The purpose of this section is to first explain why the Council of 
Europe drafted the Convention and what issues the Council was trying 
to address. Afterwards, it will describe the articles of the Convention 
that are relevant to the transfer and pardon of Safarov. These articles 
include: (1) Article II, which addresses the general principles of the 
Convention; (2) Article III, which lists the six requirements for a 
sentenced person to be transferred back to his home country; (3) Article 
IX, which addresses the effect of the transfer for the administering state; 
(4) Article X, which covers the situation in which the administering 
state decides to continue the sentencing state’s sentence; and (5) Article 
XII, which addresses the subject of pardons. 
A. The Convention’s Background and Purpose 
The Convention, opened for signing in Strasbourg, France on 
March 21, 1983110 and entered into force on July 1, 1985, is one of 
multiple legal devices that the Council of Europe has penned over the 
last thirty years to address the issue of enforcing foreign criminal 
judgments.111 The background of the Convention begins in 1978 during 
a conference of the European Ministers of Justice in Copenhagen, 
Denmark.112 At this conference, the ministers discussed the various 
problems posed by foreign prisoners and the possibility of certain 
procedural measures that would allow for the transfer of foreign 
prisoners to carry out their sentences in their home countries.113 This led 
the ministers to adopt Resolution No. 1, where the ministers asked the 
European Committee on Crime Problems (hereinafter “the CDPC”) to 
consider creating an agreement that would allow for a simple procedure 
in transferring foreign prisoners between member states and non-
member states.114 In response, the CDPC created the Select Committee 
of Experts on Foreign Nationals in Prison (hereinafter “the 
Committee”), the Committee’s primary task was to study the problems 
 
 110. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Prisoners, Explanatory Report, Mar. 21, 1983, 
E.T.S. No. 112, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/112.htm 
[hereinafter Council Explanatory Report]. 
 111. Ekkehart Muller-Rappard, The Transfer Of Sentenced Persons—Comments On The 
Relevant Council Of Europe Legal Instruments, PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 155, 155 (1991). 
 112. Council Explanatory Report, supra note 110, ¶ 1 (under Introduction). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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relating to the treatment of foreign prisoners in domestic prisons.115 The 
result of the Committee’s findings and studies led to the drafting and 
eventual adoption of the Convention.116 
According to the Convention’s explanatory report, the primary 
“purpose of the Convention is to facilitate the transfer of foreign 
prisoners to their home countries” with a simple and fast procedure.117 It 
is in this respect that the Convention was meant to supplement a 
previous prisoner transfer treaty, the European Convention on the 
International Validity of Criminal Judgments.118 Although this previous 
treaty allowed for the transfer of foreign prisoners to their home 
countries, the procedure was not efficient.119 In fact, not many states 
even ratified this previous convention.120 
There are numerous arguments in favor of prisoner transfers. One 
argument is that since a sentenced person will eventually return to his 
home country after release, the remainder of the sentence should be 
served in his home country.121 Another argument is that the process of 
rehabilitation would speed up if the sentenced person served their 
sentence in their home country.122 There are also financial arguments 
made as well; imprisonment costs a substantial amount of money and 
prisons are often overcrowded, two realities that may eventually lead to 
a weakened incentive to punish the person in the country where the 
crime was committed.123 
There appears to be three aspects of the Convention that separate it 
from previous prisoner transfer agreements that are necessary for a 
transfer to take place.124 First, in order for a transfer to occur, the 
consent of the sentenced person is required; without it, the transfer to 
the sentenced person’s home country would be impossible.125 The 
preamble lists rehabilitation of the sentenced person as a primary 
purpose that the Convention aims to address;126 a lack of consent would 
appear counterproductive to the sentenced person’s rehabilitation 
 
 115. Id. ¶ 2 (under Introduction). 
 116. Id. ¶¶ 3-5 (under Introduction).  
 117. Id. ¶ 8 (under General Considerations).  
 118. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10 (under General Considerations).  
 119. Id. ¶ 8 (under General Considerations). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Muller-Rappard, supra note 111, at 156. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 159. 
 125. Id. at 161. 
 126. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Preamble, Mar. 21, 1983, E.T.S. No. 
112. 
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process.127 A sentenced person may request a transfer from either the 
sentencing state or from the administering state.128 In addition, the 
sentencing state must inform the sentenced person of the Convention’s 
substance and must make sure that the sentenced person consents to the 
transfer “voluntarily and with full knowledge of the legal 
consequences.”129 Both the sentencing state and the administering state 
must inform the sentenced person of any decision they have made.130  
A second characteristic of the Convention is that both the 
sentencing state and the administering state must agree to the transfer.131 
“Either state may request the transfer” from the other, but neither state 
is obligated to agree and comply with the request, even if the sentenced 
person has consented and all other requirements of a transfer are 
fulfilled.132 Because neither country has an obligation to honor a request 
for transfer, the Convention does not give a list of allowable reasons to 
turn down a request, although an explanation of why a country refused 
has proven to be useful.133 
The third characteristic of the Convention, which the European 
Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments did not 
address either, is the requirement that the home state choose to either 
continue enforcing the sentence given by the sentencing state, or make a 
“‘conversion’ of the original sentence.”134 The option of “Conversion” 
allows the administering state to substitute the original sentence with a 
sentence that the same offense would receive in the state’s own legal 
system.135 If requested, the administering state must inform the 
sentencing state which of these two procedures it will follow before the 
sentencing state transfers the prisoner.136 Although the adjective 
“European” is not used in the actual name of the treaty itself, providing 
an option between “continued enforcement” and “conversion” of the 
sentence “reflects its European roots and multilateral character [of the 
Convention] in a much more flexible approach” to the countries 
involved in a transfer.137 
 
 127. Council Explanatory Report, supra note 110, ¶ 23. 
 128. Muller-Rappard, supra note 111, at 161. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 162. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 162-63. 
 134. Id. at 163-64. 
 135. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, supra note 126, art. 9. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Mark Andrew Sherman, Book Review - Transfer Of Prisoners Under International 
Instruments And Domestic Legislation: A Comparative Study, By Michael Plachta. Frieburg, 
ROSSI_FINAL_FOR_PUB 2/6/15 3:30 PM 
2015] Caucasian Powder Keg 427 
Another unique aspect of the Convention is its focus on the human 
rights of sentenced persons.138 An argument in favor of transferring 
sentenced persons back to its home country is “rooted in humanitarian 
considerations” such as the separation from a sentenced person’s family 
and friends; being imprisoned abroad brings a certain set of challenges 
that should be avoided as much as possible for simple humanitarian 
reasons.139 The explanatory report to the Convention addresses such a 
concern directly. It also recognizes that penal policy has come to lay 
greater importance on rehabilitation as opposed to punishment; 
therefore, it might be in a foreign prisoner’s best interest to have 
rehabilitation take place in his home country.140  
Behind this emphasis of rehabilitation in one’s home country are 
humanitarian concerns. The report of the Convention lists “difficulties 
in communication” due to language barriers, “alienation from local 
culture and customs,” and the lack of contact with relatives as reasons 
behind the purpose of the Convention.141 By addressing these 
humanitarian concerns, the sentenced person and the governments 
involved were thought to be better off as a result.142 
B. Relevant Articles of the Convention to the Safarov Case 
While the Convention contains twenty-five articles in total, one 
needs to refer to a handful of those articles to understand the legality of 
Hungary’s actions and the illegality of Azerbaijan’s actions in relation 
to Safarov’s case. Article II addresses the general principles of the 
Convention. Section 1 states that “[t]he Parties undertake to afford each 
other the widest measure of co-operation in respect of the transfer of 
sentenced persons in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention.”143 In addition, section 2 states that a sentenced person may 
be transferred “in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, in 
order to serve the sentence imposed on him.”144 
Article III of the Convention lists the six requirements for a 
 
Germany: Max-Planck-Institut, 1993 Pp. 565. Dm 58 (Softcover), 28 GEO. WASH.  J. INT’L L. & 
ECON 495, 513 (1995) (quoting MICHAEL PLACHTA, TRANSFER OF PRISONERS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND DOMESTIC LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 229 
(1993).).  
 138. Council Explanatory Report, supra note 110, ¶ 9.  
 139. Muller-Rappard, supra note 111, at 155-56. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, supra note 126, art. 2, § 1. 
 144. Id. art. 2, § 2. 
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sentenced person to be transferred back to his home country.145 These 
six requirements are if: (1) the sentenced person is “a national of the 
administering state;” (2) “the judgment is final;” (3) at the time the 
transfer request is received, “the sentenced person still has at least six 
months of the sentence to serve;” (4) the sentenced person consents to 
the transfer; (5) the crime for which the sentenced was imposed 
constitutes a criminal offense in the administering state or would 
constitute an offense if it was committed in the administering state; and 
(6) both the sentencing and administering states agree to the transfer.146 
Article IX addresses the effect of the transfer for the administering 
state.147 Section 1 gives the administering state the option to either 
continue the enforcement of the current sentence or convert the 
sentence.148 Section 2 states that upon the sentencing state’s request, the 
administering state shall inform the sentencing state whether it will 
continue the enforcement of the sentence or choose to convert it.149 
Finally, section 3 states that the administering state’s law will control in 
the case of continued enforcement, and that the administering state 
alone will be competent to make all appropriate decisions.150 
Article X covers the situation in which the administering state 
decides to continue the sentencing state’s sentence.151 Section 1 states 
that if the administering state decides to continue enforcement, it “shall 
be bound by the legal nature and duration of the sentence as determined 
by the sentencing State.”152 If the sentence by its nature or duration is 
not compatible with the law of the administering state, however, section 
2 allows for the sentencing state to “adapt the sanction to the 
punishment or measure prescribed by its own law for a similar 
offence.153 “As to its nature, the punishment or measure shall, as far as 
possible, correspond with that imposed by the sentence to be 
enforced.”154 
Finally, article XII addresses the subject of pardon, amnesty, and 
commutation.155 It allows either the sentencing state or the administering 
 
 145. Id. art. 3, § 1. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. art. 9. 
 148. Id. art. 9, § 1.  
 149. Id. art. 9, § 2.  
 150. Id. art. 9, § 3.  
 151. Id. art. 10. 
 152. Id. art. 10, § 1. 
 153. Id. art. 10, § 2.  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. art. 12. 
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state to “grant pardon, amnesty or commutation of the sentence in 
accordance with its Constitution or other laws.”156 
IV. THE LEGALITY OF HUNGARY AND AZERBAIJAN’S ACTIONS 
REGARDING THE TRANSFER OF SAFAROV 
The following section will provide an analysis of the legality of 
Safarov’s transfer and pardon according to Articles II, III, X, and XII of 
the Convention. The section begins with the argument that Hungary’s 
transfer of Safarov to Azerbaijan was legal because it met the six 
requirements of Article III. The section will then shift the analysis to the 
legality of Azerbaijan’s pardon of Safarov, arguing that Azerbaijan 
violated Articles II, X, and XII of the Convention, therefore making 
Azerbaijan’s pardon of Safarov contrary to international law.   
A. Hungary’s Decision to Transfer Safarov to Azerbaijan was In 
Accordance with the Convention 
Although possibly very misguided,157 Hungary’s decision to 
comply with the request to transfer Safarov back to Azerbaijan was 
legal. As stated in Article III of the Convention, six conditions need to 
be met in order for a transfer to take place; Hungary has met all six of 
those conditions. First, Safarov, an Azerbaijani military officer born in 
Azerbaijan, was a national of Azerbaijan. Second, his sentence was final 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. While the focus of this note is on Safarov’s pardon and its effects on the relations 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it should be noted that there is speculation that Hungarian 
President Viktor Orban transferred Safarov in order to strengthen Hungary’s economic ties with 
Azerbaijan. See The Axeman Goeth, ECONOMIST (Sept. 8, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21562199. Orban’s government has followed a policy called 
‘Eastern Opening,’ which focuses on increased trade and activity with near-eastern nations in 
order to attract investments to counter the effects of the Western European financial crisis. Rácz, 
supra note 91. Azerbaijan has been important in Hungarian foreign policy since 2006 thanks to 
“the large energy reserves of Baku, and the gas supply diversification possibilities offered by 
them.” Id. The newest element of ‘Eastern Opening’ “is the broadening of Hungarian policy 
interests [in Azerbaijan].” Id. This includes “attracting Azerbaijani investments in Hungary, 
looking for/securing contracts for Hungarian construction companies, and establishing a 
Hungarian trading house in Baku.” Id. In 2011, the trade exchange between Hungary and 
Azerbaijan was estimated to be around €52.8 million. Dariusz Kalan, Ill Winds Blow for Viktor 
the Troublemaker, EUOBSERVER (Sept. 7, 2012), http://euobserver.com/opinion/117470. In June 
2012, a month before the Azerbaijani government agreed to buy Hungarian public bonds worth 
€2-3 billion, Orban met personally with Aliyev in Azerbaijan. Id. While discussing Safarov’s 
pardon, an Azerbaijani governmental official claimed that “Aliyev clinched the deal [Safarov’s 
transfer] personally… with Orban in Baku in July.” Id. This has since fuelled “speculation… that 
Orban extradited Safarov in return for a promise that Azerbaijan will buy Hungarian bonds.” 
Andrew Reittman, Axe Murder Complicates EU-Azerbaijan Love Affair, EUOBSERVER (Sept. 9, 
2012), http://euobserver.com/foreign/117404.  
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and even affirmed by a Hungarian appellate court.158 Third, at the time 
of the request for his transfer, Safarov had at least twenty-five years left 
on his sentence before he would even be considered for parole, which 
was more than enough to fulfill the requirement that the sentenced 
person have at least six months remaining on his sentence.159 Fourth, 
Safarov agreed to his transfer, fulfilling the prisoner consent 
requirement. Fifth, the crime of murder is an offense in both the 
Republic of Azerbaijan and Hungary.160 Sixth, both Hungary and 
Azerbaijan consented to Safarov’s transfer, fulfilling the sentencing and 
administering states’ consent requirements. Therefore, because Hungary 
met all six of the requirements for the transfer of a sentenced person in 
the transfer of Safarov, Hungary complied with the Convention and did 
not violate international law. 
B. Azerbaijan’s Decision to Pardon Safarov Violated the Articles of the 
Convention and International Law 
Although Azerbaijan initially complied with the articles of the 
Convention during the process of Safarov’s transfer, the country 
ultimately violated the articles of the Convention by pardoning Safarov. 
The first article Azerbaijan violated through Safarov’s pardon was 
Article II of the Convention.161 As previously introduced, Article II, 
section 1 of the Convention states that “[t]he Parties undertake to afford 
each other the widest measure of co-operation in respect of the transfer 
of sentenced persons in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention.”162 Azerbaijan had previously abided by this provision in 
Article II by sending the Hungarian government a letter, dated August 
15, 2012, informing the country that it would continue to enforce 
Safarov’s sentence in accordance with Article IX of the Convention.163 
Additionally, Azerbaijan supplemented this promise by informing 
Hungary of Article 57.3 of Azerbaijan’s Criminal Code, which states 
 
 158. Azeri Jailed for Life in Hungary for Killing Armenian, supra note 90. 
 159. Top official: Safarov’s pardon fully complies with European Convention on Transfer of  
Sentenced Persons, TREND (Sept. 1, 2012), http://en.trend.az/news/society/2060884.html. 
 160. CRIM. CODE OF AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC, art. 120, available at 
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/43. 
 161. Zoltan S. Novak, Did Azerbaijan breach its international obligation by pardoning 
Safarov?, PAPRIKA POLITIK (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.paprikapolitik.com/2012/09/did-
azerbaijan-breach-its-international-obligation-by-pardoning-safarov. 
 162. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, supra note 126, art. 2, § 1. 
 163. A Possible Chronology of the Azeri-Hungarian Negotiations, HUNGARIAN SPECTRUM 
(Sept. 2, 2012), http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2012/09/02/a-possible-chronology-of-
the-azeri-hungarian-negotiations. 
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that a convict serving a life sentence in prison may only be granted 
parole after serving at least twenty-five years.164 Azerbaijan immediately 
broke this promise to Hungary, however, by pardoning Safarov upon his 
return to Azerbaijan.165 Azerbaijan blatantly violated its duty to 
Hungary to provide “the widest measure of co-operation” regarding 
Safarov’s transfer when it informed Hungary of the specific provisions 
of Azerbaijan’s Criminal Code while concealing its intention to not 
apply them in practice upon Safarov’s return.166 
In addition to requiring “the widest measure of co-operation” when 
transferring a prisoner, Article II, section 2 states that a prisoner will be 
transferred back to his home country “in order to serve the sentence 
imposed on him.”167 Most importantly, this means that the Convention 
prohibits the transfer of a prisoner “in order to evade the sentence 
imposed on him.”168 Although Article XII allows for the pardon of a 
prisoner when a transfer is complete, when one reads it together with 
Article II, section 2, the Convention suggests that the home country may 
not pardon the prisoner “immediately and for any reason.”169 While 
citing Article XII as its primary reason for pardoning Safarov,170 
Azerbaijan ignored and violated Article II, section 2 by immediately 
pardoning Safarov without reason instead of continuing to enforce his 
sentence as previously promised.171 Such an immediate and swift pardon 
was a clear demonstration that Safarov’s transfer “obviously did not 
have the purpose that [Safarov] serve his sentence there.”172 This 
immediate pardon, in addition to not continuing Safarov’s Hungarian 
sentence as promised in the August 15, 2012 letter, ultimately means 
that “Azerbaijan breached the international law obligations of good faith 
and cooperation in the performance of a treaty.”173 
The second article that Azerbaijan’s pardon of Safarov breached 
was Article X of the Convention. Under Article IX, Azerbaijan, as the 
administering state in the transfer, can choose to either continue 
 
 164. Id. 
    165.   Id. 
 166. Novak, supra note 161. 
 167. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, supra note 126, art. 2, § 2.  
 168. Mark Movsesian, Ax Murderers, Values, and International Law, CENTER FOR LAW AND 
RELIGION FORUM AT ST. JOHN’S UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (Sept. 9, 2012), 
http://clrforum.org/2012/09/09/ax-murderers-values-and-international-law/. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Top official: Safarov’s pardon fully complies with European Convention on Transfer 
of Sentenced Persons, supra note 159. 
 171. See Movsesian, supra note 168. 
 172. Novak, supra note 161. 
 173. Movsesian, supra note 168, at 2. 
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enforcing the sentence that Hungary, the sentencing state, gave Safarov 
or to convert the sentence.174 As shown in the August 15, 2012 letter to 
Hungary, Azerbaijan clearly chose to continue enforcing Safarov’s life 
sentence.175 Thus, Article X of the Convention, which covers situations 
in which the administering state continues enforcement, binded 
Azerbaijan.176 
Section 1 of Article X states that the administering state “shall be 
bound by the legal nature and duration of the sentence as determined by 
the sentencing state.”177 Reading only section 1, Azerbaijan clearly 
violated Article X; it failed to punish Safarov at all, let alone punish him 
according to the “nature and duration” of the Hungarian court’s life 
sentence for murder.178 This is not a violation in and of itself, however, 
because Section 2 provides that in the case the sentencing state’s 
sentence is incompatible with the law of the administering state, then 
the administering state can “adapt the sanction to the punishment as 
prescribed by its own law for a similar offense,” corresponding with the 
sentence given in the sentencing state.179 There are various examples 
from foreign cases that showcase how an administering state may adapt 
a sentencing state’s punishment to its own law when the punishment is 
incompatible with the administering state’s law. 
Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department is an 
example of how an administering state adapted a sentencing state’s 
punishment to its own law when the sentence was incompatible.180 In 
late 1984, Spanish authorities arrested British citizen Gary John Read 
and the court sentenced him with the offense of “introducing counterfeit 
currency into Spain;” he received a prison term of twelve years and one 
day in 1985.181 In 1986, Read successfully applied for transfer back to 
the United Kingdom under the provisions of the Convention as well as 
the United Kingdom’s 1984 Repatriation of Prisoner’s Act.182 The 
United Kingdom, like Azerbaijan, promised to continue the 
enforcement of Read’s sentence, and therefore had to abide by article X 
 
 174. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, supra note 126, art. 9. 
 175. A Possible Chronology of the Azeri-Hungarian Negotiations, supra note 163. 
 176. See Novak, supra note 161. 
 177. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, supra note 126, art. 10, § 1. 
 178. See Novak, supra note 161. 
 179. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, supra note 126, art. 10, § 2. 
 180. See generally Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex. p. Read (Gary 
John), [1988] 2 W.L.R. 236, 239 (Eng.). 
 181. Id. at 236. 
 182. Id. 
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of the Convention.183 British law, however, was incompatible with 
Read’s Spanish sentence because it only allowed for a maximum ten 
years in prison for the same crime.184 In addition, due to the small 
amount of counterfeit money that Read introduced, under British law he 
would not have been incarcerated for more than four years if the crime 
had occurred in the United Kingdom instead of in Spain.185  
The Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department court, 
after analyzing and interpreting the meaning of Article X of the 
Convention, came to two simple conclusions.186 First, if a foreign 
sentence is less than the maximum domestic sentence, then the prisoner 
serves the foreign sentence in full.187  Second, if the foreign sentence is 
greater than the maximum domestic sentence, then it shall be reduced.188 
According to the court, “[t]his . . . was the intention of article 10. To go 
further would fly in the face of paragraph 2 of article 10.”189 The court 
subsequently ordered a reduction of Read’s sentence in line with British 
law.190 
Gilbey v. HM Advocate presents another scenario in which the 
administering state’s law was incompatible with the prisoner’s sentence 
from the sentencing state. On October 19, 2001, Thai authorities 
arrested Julian Gilbey, a British citizen, for drug trafficking.191 Gilbey 
attempted to board a plane with more than 3.3 grams of high-quality 
heroin, which earned him a death sentence under Thai law (which was 
later reduced to life-in-prison).192 After two failed attempts to appeal in 
2004 and 2006, Gilbey requested to be transferred back to the United 
Kingdom in 2009 in accordance with the Convention on the Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons; the United Kingdom decided to continue 
enforcement of the punishment.193 Similar to the previous case, British 
law was not compatible with Thai law in that a drug trafficking offense 
would not receive a sentence such as the death penalty or a life sentence 
in the United Kingdom.194 Thus, the goal for the Gilbey court, like the 
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goal in Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, was to 
“fix an appropriate punishment” part referable to a life sentence 
received by the prisoner in Thailand for drug trafficking offenses.195   
After interpreting Article X of the Convention, the Gilbey court 
ruled similarly to the court in Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department; Article X allows for the administering state “to enforce the 
sentence imposed in the sentencing state,” but the administering state 
“does so in accordance with the requirements of its own penal 
system.”196 The court also took into account the severity of Gilbey’s 
crime, noting the amount of heroin he attempted to smuggle.197 As a 
result, the British court gave Gilbey a sentence of 10 years, which 
corresponded “‘as far as possible’ to the essential characteristics of the 
original sentence and, in particular, to the earliest date at which Mr. 
Gilbey might have become eligible for parole had he remained in Thai 
custody.”198 
If one follows the language of Article X, section 2, while also 
following the reasoning of Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department and Gilbey v. HM Advocate, Azerbaijan certainly did not 
have to enforce Hungary’s sentence of Safarov word for word if the 
Hungarian prison sentence was incompatible with Azerbaijani law.199 As 
demonstrated by Azerbaijan’s pardon despite their August 15, 2012 
letter to Hungary, the sentence was unacceptable and inconsistent 
pursuant to Azerbaijan law.200 Whereas Azerbaijan allows for 
conditional parole after at least twenty-five years of incarceration, 
Hungarian law requires thirty years.201 This would mean that once 
Hungary transferred Safarov back to Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan could have 
lowered the amount of time Safarov needed to serve by five years.202  
This is obviously not what Azerbaijan did by releasing Safarov 
immediately and clearing him of all wrongdoing without any domestic 
review by the Azerbaijani courts.203 Azerbaijan selected the option of 
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continuing Safarov’s enforcement, which bound it to Article X as well 
as obligated it to apply the Azerbaijani equivalent of Safarov’s 
Hungarian sentence.204 Instead, Azerbaijan pardoned Safarov when its 
only option would be to lower Safarov’s sentence by five years.205 This 
decision by Azerbaijan to not abide by its obligation to Article X and 
apply its domestic law to Safarov’s sentence means that it violated 
Article X, “fly in the face of paragraph 2,”206 therefore violating the 
Convention for a second time.207 
Azerbaijan has never addressed the violation of Articles II and X 
in regards to Safarov’s pardon; the country focused its arguments on 
Article XII, which allows a country to pardon, though with 
limitations.208 According to Article XII, “[e]ach party may grant pardon, 
amnesty or commutation of the sentence in accordance with its 
Constitution or other laws.”209 Azerbaijan claims that since the pardon 
was in accordance with the Azerbaijani Constitution along with Article 
XII, which allows for pardons, it did not do anything contrary to the 
Convention or international law.210 It seems at first that Azerbaijan’s 
contention is seemingly correct, since Article XII “expresses the right to 
pardon in such a plain language that it seems almost impossible to argue 
that the contested move [of Safarov] constitutes a breach of the 
Convention.”211 Ultimately, this is an incorrect argument. 
As discussed previously, when one reads Article XII with Article 
II, the Convention does not allow a prisoner to transfer so that the 
prisoner may evade the sentence imposed on him.212 To allow a prisoner 
to evade the sentence imposed on him would go directly against the 
purpose of “enforcing the sentence” of the transferred prisoner.213 In 
addition, the preamble of the Convention states that cooperation through 
the treaty “should further the ends of justice.”214 Allowing a prisoner to 
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evade a deserved sentence would in no way “further the ends of 
justice,” especially in a case like Safarov’s where due process was 
afforded to him and the evidence of his violent murder was undisputed. 
It seems then that although the language of Article XII seems so 
plain as to allow a pardon at any time, to do so would directly violate 
the whole purpose of the Convention: enforcing a prisoner’s sentence. 
Article XII thus appears to be a catchall provision, to be used in a 
situation where something has gone wrong in the transfer process or in 
the sentencing process of the sentencing state. If Article XII is viewed 
as a catchall provision, a last resort, it would mean that the Articles 
before it, which would be Articles II and X in Azerbaijan’s case, would 
preempt article XII; those two articles would have to be followed first 
before Article XII becomes a usable option. As discussed previously, 
Azerbaijan did not follow Articles II and X of the Convention and 
instead, used Article XII immediately. In doing so, Azerbaijan ignored 
the primary Articles of the Convention and immediately used the 
catchall provision intended for a situation that had not arisen. 
Even in the event that an administering state such as Azerbaijan 
had followed the preceding articles that preempt Article XII before 
invoking Article XII’s power to pardon, the fact that the Convention’s 
purpose is to enforce sentences implies that a pardon cannot be granted 
freely. Arguments have been made that the administering state “may not 
pardon a prisoner immediately and for any reason at all,” which means 
that “there must be some changed circumstance casting doubt on the 
sentence,” such as “the prisoner’s remorse or good behavior” before the 
state proceeds to possibly pardoning the person.215 Unfortunately, 
foreign cases do not provide many examples of the sorts of “changed 
circumstances” that would cast enough doubt on a sentence to justify a 
pardon. Regina (Shields) v. Secretary of State for Justice, however, does 
provide an example of the “changed circumstances” that could justify 
the use of Article XII.216 
In Shields, Bulgarian authorities arrested Michael Shields, a British 
citizen, for attempted murder on May 30, 2005; the Bulgarian court 
sentenced him to ten years in prison.217 Earlier that day, English soccer 
fans had been involved in a fight at a diner in which they had assaulted 
and inflicted serious injuries on a barman.218 Authorities later arrested 
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Shields for being involved.219 Another one of the arrested men signed a 
confession after Shields’ trial that stated that Shields was not the 
assailant.220 Despite this confession absolving Shields of any 
wrongdoing, the Bulgarian court still denied Shields’ multiple 
appeals.221 In 2007, Bulgaria transferred Shields to the United Kingdom 
under the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons in order to 
serve the remainder of his sentence at home.222 In the United Kingdom, 
there had been much public support for Shields to be pardoned, calling 
his sentence a miscarriage of justice.223  
In deciding whether or not the Secretary of State had the power to 
consider granting a pardon, the Shields court discussed the scenario in 
which the Convention intended for a pardon to be issued.224 The court 
concluded that pardons are “intended in very rare cases to secure justice 
which the concluded court process cannot achieve.”225 Such a situation 
might arise when “fresh evidence was available which was, or would 
be, inadmissible or not capable of being given in court proceedings” 
that would acquit the prisoner. For example, the court in Shields notes 
that a pardon could be appropriate where newly discovered video 
surveillance, though inadmissible, inconclusively establishes the 
prisoner’s innocence.226 If the court concludes that this new evidence, 
which was unavailable at the time of trial, justifies a conclusion that a 
prisoner is “morally and technically innocent,” then the court may 
consider granting a pardon, although it is not required to.227 
Azerbaijan’s reasoning that it had the right to grant Safarov a full 
pardon thus fails on two counts.228 First, the Convention implies that in 
order to grant a pardon, “there must be some changed circumstance 
casting doubt on the sentence,” such as “the prisoners remorse or good 
behavior.”229 There exists no evidence to suggest that any new 
circumstances ever arose to cast doubt on Safarov’s sentence for the 
murder of Margaryan. On the contrary, Azerbaijan’s August 15 letter to 
Hungary promising to continue enforcement of Safarov’s sentence 
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supports the contention that Azerbaijan had no doubts about the 
sentence itself.230 In addition, not only did Safarov fail to show any 
remorse for his actions, which may cast some doubt on his sentence, he 
was in fact justifying them, claiming that he was exacting revenge for 
the Nagorno-Karabakh War and that Margaryan allegedly insulted the 
Azerbaijani flag.231  
Second, the circumstances of Safarov’s sentence are not analogous 
to the type of situation that the Shields court suggests would allow a 
party to the Convention to consider granting a pardon in accordance 
with Article XII.232 No new evidence arose between Safarov’s trial and 
his pardon; there was no surveillance video suggesting the contrary or a 
confession from another individual clearing Safarov of his wrongdoing. 
This lack of evidence makes it impossible for an Azerbaijani court to 
have found Safarov as “morally and technically innocent,” meaning that 
Azerbaijan should not have even considered granting Safarov a 
pardon.233  
Because the purpose of the Convention is to enforce the sentences 
of prisoners, Article XII’s power to pardon is a catchall provision to 
resort to should there be a problem in the transfer or in the sentencing 
process from the original sentencing state.234 Viewed as a catchall 
provision, the state must first follow the previous articles of the 
Convention that preempt Article XII, which in Azerbaijan’s case are 
Articles II and X.235 Even if an administering state such as Azerbaijan 
were to pardon under Article XII, it still should not pardon a prisoner 
for merely any reason. Past case law interpreting appropriate scenarios 
for an Article XII pardon includes changed circumstances casting doubt 
on the prisoner’s sentence or the presence of new evidence that would 
allow a court to find the prisoner “morally and technically innocent.”236 
In Safarov’s case, neither of these scenarios was present. Therefore, 
Azerbaijan violated Article XII of the Convention by disregarding 
Articles II and X before invoking Article XII, and by immediately 
pardoning Safarov after his transfer without a proper reason.237 While 
the fact that Azerbaijan’s pardon of Safarov is illegal is already 
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unfavorable, the most unfavorable part of this whole situation, however, 
is the negative effects that Safarov’s pardon will have on the already 
tense relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
V. THE EFFECTS OF SAFAROV’S PARDON ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN 
This final section of the note will begin by explaining the state of 
Armenian-Azerbaijani relations between the end of the Nagorno-
Karabakh War and Safarov’s pardon, focusing on the negotiation 
process between the two countries. It will then describe the 
ramifications that Safarov’s pardon will have on Armenian-Azerbaijani 
relations. These ramifications include both the short-term effect of 
significantly raising tensions, which might potentially incite another 
war, and the long-term effect of worsening the already negative ethnic 
views that Armenians have towards Azerbaijanis. 
A. The Negotiation Process Between Armenia and Azerbaijan Since the 
End of the Nagorno-Karabakh War 
Since the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War, the momentum of 
hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan has hardly ceased.238 
Clashes have continued since the end of large-scale warfare, increasing 
in intensity up until the present day.239 Despite the horrors of the war 
and the continued skirmishes, however, a negotiation process has 
existed since 1992 that has sought a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict.240 Spearheading the original 1992 mediation process 
was the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
[hereinafter OSCE] Minsk Group,241 whom has dominated the peace 
process ever since.242 The Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, Russia, 
and the United States, is responsible for finding a solution to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.243 Since these original 1992 negotiations, 
there have been a number of various proposals and summits between 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh.244 
In 1997, the Minsk Group presented the first two major proposals 
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for peace. The first was a packaged deal that called for an end to all 
disputes among the parties, and proposed that Nagorno-Karabakh 
remain a sovereign part of Azerbaijan.245 The second was a step-by-step 
proposal that proposed the withdrawal of Armenian forces from 
Azerbaijani territory outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, the return of 
displaced persons to their homes, and an end to economic embargoes; 
the status of Nagorno-Karabakh would become a talking-point once the 
parties completed all of these steps.246 Although Armenia and 
Azerbaijan agreed to both of these plans, Nagorno-Karabakh authorities 
rejected both, citing the importance of Nagorno-Karabakh’s 
independence.247 
After the failure of the 1997 proposals, more failed talks followed. 
In 1998, the Minsk Group presented a common state proposal in which 
Nagorno-Karabakh would have de facto and not de jure independence 
status.248 Azerbaijan rejected this proposal as “defeatist.”249 The Key 
West and Paris talks of 2001 reportedly saw the possibility of a land-
exchange; Armenian-held Azerbaijani territories in exchange for an 
Armenian-governed Nagorno-Karabakh.250 Domestic pressure in both 
countries destroyed the negotiations and led leaders in each country to 
deny that the talks ever happened, which only delayed negotiations 
further.251  
In 2004, a series of meetings took place in Prague between 
Armenian and Azerbaijani officials, which led to the Minsk Group 
presenting the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents with basic 
principles outlining a settlement in 2005.252 In 2006, the Minsk co-
chairman “partially revealed the basic principles” in order to pressure 
the parties to agree to them.253 The basic principles consisted of actions 
such as the “renunciation of the use of force . . . gradual withdrawal of 
Armenian forces from occupied districts,” and “restoration of 
communications between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”254  
In 2007, the Minsk Group presented these same principles to 
Armenia and Azerbaijan in Madrid, reaffirming the principles as a basis 
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for settlement.255 This was a significant development because it was “no 
longer a non-paper but an official proposal deposited with the 
Chairman-in-office of the OSCE which would serve as a basis for the 
future negotiations.”256 With the “Madrid Proposals,” both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan came to an agreement that “the final status [of Nagorno-
Karabakh] would be determined at the last stage after all other 
confidence building measures had been put in place.”257 These 
measures, however, would only take place after a mechanism for 
determining Nagorno-Karabakh’s status had been reached as well.258 
Once again, the parties were not able to solve the conflict, disagreeing 
over the Madrid principles themselves as well as the mechanism for 
determining Nagorno-Karabakh’s status.259 
The latest of the talks to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
occurred in October of 2010.260 With Russian president Dimitry 
Medvedev hosting the negotiations, both the Armenian and Azerbaijani 
sides “agreed to swap prisoners captured during fighting and the bodies 
of soldiers and civilians killed in the recent conflicts.”261 Needless to 
say, despite the past failures of the negotiations and the hostility 
between the two sides, the meeting that Medvedev hosted inspired “a 
somewhat moderate optimism” that the conflict could still end 
peacefully.262 Azerbaijan’s pardon of Safarov, however, has effectively 
destroyed this optimism. 
B. Safarov’s Pardon and an End to the Hope for Peace 
On the one hand, Safarov’s pardon had the immediate effect of 
raising tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, presenting the 
possibility of war once again.263 In the immediate aftermath of Safarov’s 
pardon, the Armenian reaction was one of outrage, with Armenian 
president Serzh Sarkisian stating that Armenia does not “want a war, 
but if we [Armenia] have to, we will fight and win. We are not afraid of 
killers, even if they enjoy the protection of the head of state.”264 
Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian later expounded on 
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Armenia’s anger over Azerbaijan’s actions in a speech at the United 
Nations on October 1, 2012.265 In the speech, Nalbandian accused 
Azerbaijan of violating international commitments, instilling “anti-
Armenian hysteria” into Azerbaijani society, and blatantly infringing 
upon the human rights of Armenians.266 Nalbandian also accused 
Azerbaijan of ruining the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, “war-
mongering,” “systematic ceasefire violations” on the borders of 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, and working with Turkey to continue 
a blockade of economic cooperation with Armenia “until there are no 
more Armenians in Armenia.”267 In response to the criticism, Azerbaijan 
claimed that the “Armenian reaction was ‘hysterical’ and that President 
Sargsyan of Armenia had even secretly ordered the assassination of 
Safarov.”268 
This escalation of hostility threatens to end the peace process that, 
since the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War, has prevented Armenia 
and Azerbaijan from “sliding back into bloody conflict.”269 Without a 
peace process, “what’s left is a vacuum, which gets filled with an 
escalation toward war,” making the already tumultuous situation 
“suddenly more dangerous.”270 Such fears that another war between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan may begin due to Safarov’s pardon is not just 
mere speculation either.271 Various governmental bodies from around 
the world, including the European Union and the United States House 
of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, have expressed 
concern that Safarov’s pardon will obliterate “any near-term hopes for 
building trust between Armenia and Azerbaijan,” undermining the 
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“attempts to foster peace in the volatile Caucasus region.”272 
Furthermore, Armenia’s plans to reopen an airport within Nagorno-
Karabakh could raise even more hostilities, due to the fact that the 
population in and around Nagorno-Karabakh “is extremely vulnerable 
to violations of ceasefire and escalation of the conflict.”273 At the 
moment, international efforts to prevent immediate conflict have 
worked, “but more by luck than judgment.”274 The fact that this conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a “‘frozen-conflict’ left over from 
the Cold War,” however, means that it “can and will re-ignite with 
appalling speed if ignored for long enough.”275 
On the other hand, Safarov’s pardon will have the longer-lasting 
effect of negatively influencing the ethnic tensions and feelings 
Armenians have toward Azerbaijanis. Armenians often refuse “to 
acknowledge Azerbaijanis as a distinct ethnic group.”276 Armenians 
closely associate “the Turkic speaking Azerbaijanis with Turks,” whose 
ancestors Armenians see as having “played a devastating role in 
Armenian history” through invasions, massacres, and colonization of 
the area since the 10th century.277 These historic injustices “culminated 
in the Armenian Genocide of 1915 in Ottoman Turkey.”278 “Though the 
Azerbaijanis were never a part of the Ottoman Empire,”279 Armenians 
consider the Azerbaijanis to be members of the “‘genocidal’ Turkish 
nation,” instilling within them the fear of “genocide of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenians, should NK [Nagorno-Karabakh] become part of 
independent Azerbaijan.”280 
Likewise, Azerbaijanis see Armenians as a destructive force as 
well.281 During the Tsarist period of Russian rule, “Russia employed 
policies of assimilation and relocated” many Christian Armenians to 
Azerbaijani regions while “deporting Muslims from the same areas.”282 
In addition, Azerbaijanis remember “examples of [the] 1918 Russian 
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massacres of Azerbaijanis that Armenians participated in.”283 As a 
result, Azerbaijanis view Armenians “as opportunistic aggressors that 
used their good relationship with Russia to expand into Azerbaijani 
territories in the east.”284 
Since the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1988, these 
negative views that Armenians and Azerbaijanis hold for each other 
have become more hostile.285 Each side sees the other as “the archenemy 
who methodically destroys their population and cultural heritage,” and 
guilty of the Nagorno-Karabakh War, ethnic cleansing, and lying about 
history in order to push political agendas.286 Such negative views have 
also given rise to powerful radicals on both sides, producing rhetoric 
that labels moderates as traitors and turns educational institutions into 
propaganda machines.287 As a result, an entire generation of Armenians 
and Azerbaijanis has grown up with propaganda that promotes these 
negative stereotypes, intensifying “mistrust and hatred” for each 
other.288  
With such an atmosphere of mutual hate and distrust already in 
existence, Safarov’s pardon only made these hateful views stronger, and 
gave more power to the radicals on each side.289 Especially on the 
Armenian side of the conflict, Safarov’s pardon strengthens “the hands 
of those Armenian hardliners who say that this proves that Azerbaijanis 
are barbarians who cannot be trusted.”290 With Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis having held such powerful and negative stereotypes of 
each other in the past, Safarov’s pardon does nothing but reinforce these 
stereotypes, especially the Armenian views of Azerbaijanis, and will 
reinforce “the ‘us versus them’ dynamic [that] is central to defining 
relations between the two societies.”291 
 
 
 
 
 
 283. Id. at 39. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 39-40. 
 288. Id. at 40. 
 289. de Waal, supra note 96. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Gamaghelyan, supra note 7, at 40. 
ROSSI_FINAL_FOR_PUB 2/6/15 3:30 PM 
2015] Caucasian Powder Keg 445 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Azerbaijan’s pardon of Safarov was undoubtedly a direct violation 
of international law and the underlying principles of the Convention on 
the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. Azerbaijan argues that under Article 
XII, it had the authority to pardon Safarov unconditionally. Azerbaijan, 
however, simply ignored the other articles of the Convention relevant to 
Safarov’s pardon in order to reach this conclusion. 
Azerbaijan violated Article II by not providing Hungary with the 
“widest measure of co-operation” in Safarov’s transfer and by agreeing 
to accept Safarov without the intent of having him serve his sentence.292 
Azerbaijan also violated Article X by not continuing the enforcement of 
Safarov’s Hungarian sentence. Additionally, although Azerbaijan 
believes that it had the unrestricted right to pardon Safarov under 
Article XII, this is simply untrue when one looks to the purpose of the 
Convention and the international interpretation of when a pardon is 
appropriate. Because the purpose of the Convention is the enforcement 
of sentences, Article XII is a catchall provision to invoke in the event 
that something has gone wrong with the transfer or the sentencing 
process. Even when an administering state does use Article XII’s 
pardoning power, it may not pardon for any reason at all. A pardon 
would be appropriate if there is a changed circumstance casting doubt 
on the prisoner’s sentence or if new evidence would allow a court to 
find the prisoner “morally and technically innocent.”293 These scenarios 
were not present in Safarov’s case, and because Azerbaijan pardoned 
Safarov in the absence of such a scenario, it violated Article XII. 
Azerbaijan’s violation of the Convention, however, is not even the 
most regretful outcome of Safarov’s pardon. What’s worst is how 
Azerbaijan’s actions will negatively affect the already strained 
relationship it has with Armenia. In the aftermath of the Nagorno-
Karabakh War until Azerbaijan’s pardon of Safarov, a peace process 
existed that tried to settle the conflict. Safarov’s pardon effectively 
ended any remaining optimism and has the short-term effect of raising 
tensions between the two nations, introducing the possibility of more 
violence. In addition, Safarov’s pardon will have the long-term effect of 
reinforcing the negative stereotypes that Armenians hold toward 
Azerbaijanis, further putting strain on the ethnic relations between the 
 
    292.   Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, supra note 126, art 2, ¶ 1 (under 
General Principles). 
 293. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex. p. Read (Gary John), [1988] 2 
W.L.R. 236, 239 (Eng.). 
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two peoples. 
At this point it appears as though there is no return from the low 
state of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations that Safarov’s pardon has 
caused, which ultimately means there is no end in sight to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. Ideally, the principles espoused in the Madrid 
Proposals would bring the most resolution to the conflict. Such 
principles would first open up communication between the two sides, 
put an end to any force, and lead to the withdrawal of Armenian forces 
from occupied Azerbaijani territory. However, although the original 
proposals called for Nagorno-Karabakh’s status to be decided upon after 
these steps, this is ultimately unrealistic. 
Nagorno-Karabakh is wholly Armenian, and at this point there is 
nothing that Azerbaijan can do to convince the Nagorno-Karabakh 
government to willingly join Azerbaijan once again. The only way 
Azerbaijan could try and reclaim the territory is through more war, 
which would be a very misguided move considering the past successes 
of the Armenian-backed Nagorno-Karabakh military. Azerbaijan needs 
to abandon the prospect of claiming Nagorno-Karabakh as its own. 
Allowing Nagorno-Karabakh to permanently remain independent and 
having Armenia give back any other occupied Azerbaijani territory is 
the only way to avoid war and achieve peace, simply because it is the 
only option that will not forcibly move or kill more people on either 
side of the conflict. However, only time will tell as to how realistic this 
option is. 
 
